forked from wrenn/wrenn
Add mTLS to CP→agent channel
- Internal ECDSA P-256 CA (WRENN_CA_CERT/WRENN_CA_KEY env vars); when absent the system falls back to plain HTTP so dev mode works without certificates - Host leaf cert (7-day TTL, IP SAN) issued at registration and renewed on every JWT refresh; fingerprint + expiry stored in DB (cert_expires_at column replaces the removed mtls_enabled flag) - CP ephemeral client cert (24-hour TTL) via CPCertStore with atomic hot-swap; background goroutine renews it every 12 hours without restarting the server - Host agent uses tls.Listen + httpServer.Serve so GetCertificate callback is respected (ListenAndServeTLS always reads cert from disk) - Sandbox reverse proxy now uses pool.Transport() so it shares the same TLS config as the Connect RPC clients instead of http.DefaultTransport - Credentials file renamed host-credentials.json with cert_pem/key_pem/ ca_cert_pem fields; duplicate register/refresh response structs collapsed to authResponse
This commit is contained in:
@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ type HostService struct {
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Redis *redis.Client
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JWT []byte
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Pool *lifecycle.HostClientPool
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CA *auth.CA // nil disables mTLS cert issuance (dev/test environments)
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}
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// HostCreateParams holds the parameters for creating a host.
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@ -55,18 +56,28 @@ type HostRegisterParams struct {
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Address string
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}
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// HostRegisterResult holds the registered host, its short-lived JWT, and a long-lived refresh token.
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// HostRegisterResult holds the registered host, its short-lived JWT, a long-lived
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// refresh token, and optionally the host's mTLS certificate material.
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type HostRegisterResult struct {
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Host db.Host
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JWT string
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RefreshToken string
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// mTLS cert material — empty when CA is not configured.
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CertPEM string
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KeyPEM string
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CACertPEM string
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}
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// HostRefreshResult holds a new JWT and rotated refresh token after a successful refresh.
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// HostRefreshResult holds a new JWT and rotated refresh token after a successful
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// refresh, plus refreshed mTLS certificate material when CA is configured.
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type HostRefreshResult struct {
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Host db.Host
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JWT string
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RefreshToken string
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// mTLS cert material — empty when CA is not configured.
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CertPEM string
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KeyPEM string
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CACertPEM string
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}
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// HostDeletePreview describes what will be affected by deleting a host.
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@ -268,14 +279,25 @@ func (s *HostService) Register(ctx context.Context, p HostRegisterParams) (HostR
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return HostRegisterResult{}, fmt.Errorf("sign host token: %w", err)
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}
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// Issue mTLS certificate if CA is configured.
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var hc auth.HostCert
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if s.CA != nil {
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hc, err = auth.IssueHostCert(s.CA, id.FormatHostID(hostID), p.Address)
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if err != nil {
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return HostRegisterResult{}, fmt.Errorf("issue host cert: %w", err)
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}
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}
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// Atomically update only if still pending (defense-in-depth against races).
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rowsAffected, err := s.DB.RegisterHost(ctx, db.RegisterHostParams{
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ID: hostID,
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Arch: p.Arch,
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CpuCores: p.CPUCores,
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MemoryMb: p.MemoryMB,
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DiskGb: p.DiskGB,
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Address: p.Address,
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ID: hostID,
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Arch: p.Arch,
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CpuCores: p.CPUCores,
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MemoryMb: p.MemoryMB,
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DiskGb: p.DiskGB,
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Address: p.Address,
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CertFingerprint: hc.Fingerprint,
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CertExpiresAt: pgtype.Timestamptz{Time: hc.ExpiresAt, Valid: s.CA != nil},
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})
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if err != nil {
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return HostRegisterResult{}, fmt.Errorf("register host: %w", err)
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@ -301,7 +323,13 @@ func (s *HostService) Register(ctx context.Context, p HostRegisterParams) (HostR
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return HostRegisterResult{}, fmt.Errorf("fetch updated host: %w", err)
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}
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return HostRegisterResult{Host: host, JWT: hostJWT, RefreshToken: refreshToken}, nil
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result := HostRegisterResult{Host: host, JWT: hostJWT, RefreshToken: refreshToken}
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if s.CA != nil {
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result.CertPEM = hc.CertPEM
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result.KeyPEM = hc.KeyPEM
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result.CACertPEM = s.CA.PEM
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}
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return result, nil
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}
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// Refresh validates a refresh token, rotates it (revokes old, issues new),
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@ -328,6 +356,22 @@ func (s *HostService) Refresh(ctx context.Context, refreshToken string) (HostRef
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return HostRefreshResult{}, fmt.Errorf("sign host JWT: %w", err)
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}
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// Renew mTLS certificate if CA is configured.
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var hc auth.HostCert
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if s.CA != nil {
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hc, err = auth.IssueHostCert(s.CA, id.FormatHostID(host.ID), host.Address)
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if err != nil {
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return HostRefreshResult{}, fmt.Errorf("renew host cert: %w", err)
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}
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if err := s.DB.UpdateHostCert(ctx, db.UpdateHostCertParams{
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ID: host.ID,
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CertFingerprint: hc.Fingerprint,
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CertExpiresAt: pgtype.Timestamptz{Time: hc.ExpiresAt, Valid: true},
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}); err != nil {
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return HostRefreshResult{}, fmt.Errorf("update host cert: %w", err)
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}
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}
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// Issue-then-revoke rotation: insert new token first so a crash between
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// the two DB calls leaves the host with two valid tokens rather than zero.
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newRefreshToken, err := s.issueRefreshToken(ctx, host.ID)
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@ -340,7 +384,13 @@ func (s *HostService) Refresh(ctx context.Context, refreshToken string) (HostRef
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return HostRefreshResult{}, fmt.Errorf("revoke old refresh token: %w", err)
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}
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return HostRefreshResult{Host: host, JWT: hostJWT, RefreshToken: newRefreshToken}, nil
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result := HostRefreshResult{Host: host, JWT: hostJWT, RefreshToken: newRefreshToken}
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if s.CA != nil {
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result.CertPEM = hc.CertPEM
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result.KeyPEM = hc.KeyPEM
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result.CACertPEM = s.CA.PEM
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}
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return result, nil
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}
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// issueRefreshToken creates a new refresh token record in the DB and returns
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