Merge pull request 'Improved codebase to prepare for production' (#32) from chore/hardening into dev

Reviewed-on: wrenn/wrenn#32

.env.example

@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+# Shared (applies to both control plane and host agent)
+WRENN_DIR=/var/lib/wrenn
+LOG_LEVEL=info
+
 # Database
 DATABASE_URL=postgres://wrenn:wrenn@localhost:5432/wrenn?sslmode=disable
 
@@ -9,7 +13,6 @@ WRENN_CP_LISTEN_ADDR=:9725
 
 # Host Agent
 WRENN_HOST_LISTEN_ADDR=:50051
-WRENN_DIR=/var/lib/wrenn
 WRENN_HOST_INTERFACE=eth0
 WRENN_CP_URL=http://localhost:9725
 WRENN_DEFAULT_ROOTFS_SIZE=5Gi

CLAUDE.md

@@ -12,10 +12,10 @@ All commands go through the Makefile. Never use raw `go build` or `go run`.
 
 ```bash
 make build              # Build all binaries → builds/
-make build-cp           # Control plane only (builds frontend first)
+make build-cp           # Control plane only
 make build-agent        # Host agent only
 make build-envd         # envd static binary (verified statically linked)
-make build-frontend     # SvelteKit dashboard → internal/dashboard/static/
+make build-frontend     # SvelteKit dashboard → frontend/build/ (served by Caddy)
 
 make dev                # Full local dev: infra + migrate + control plane
 make dev-infra          # Start PostgreSQL + Prometheus + Grafana (Docker)
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ User SDK → HTTPS/WS → Control Plane → Connect RPC → Host Agent → HTTP/
 | Binary | Module | Entry point | Runs as |
 |--------|--------|-------------|---------|
 | wrenn-cp | `git.omukk.dev/wrenn/wrenn` | `cmd/control-plane/main.go` | Unprivileged |
-| wrenn-agent | `git.omukk.dev/wrenn/wrenn` | `cmd/host-agent/main.go` | Root (NET_ADMIN + /dev/kvm) |
+| wrenn-agent | `git.omukk.dev/wrenn/wrenn` | `cmd/host-agent/main.go` | `wrenn` user with capabilities (SYS_ADMIN, NET_ADMIN, NET_RAW, SYS_PTRACE, KILL, DAC_OVERRIDE, MKNOD) via setcap; also accepts root |
 | envd | `git.omukk.dev/wrenn/wrenn/envd` (standalone `envd/go.mod`) | `envd/main.go` | PID 1 inside guest VM |
 
 envd is a **completely independent Go module**. It is never imported by the main module. The only connection is the protobuf contract. It compiles to a static binary baked into rootfs images.
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ envd is a **completely independent Go module**. It is never imported by the main
 
 ### Control Plane
 
-**Internal packages:** `internal/api/`, `internal/dashboard/`, `internal/email/`
+**Internal packages:** `internal/api/`, `internal/email/`
 
 **Public packages (importable by cloud repo):** `pkg/config/`, `pkg/db/`, `pkg/auth/`, `pkg/auth/oauth/`, `pkg/scheduler/`, `pkg/lifecycle/`, `pkg/channels/`, `pkg/audit/`, `pkg/service/`, `pkg/events/`, `pkg/id/`, `pkg/validate/`
 
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ Startup (`cmd/control-plane/main.go`) is a thin wrapper: `cpserver.Run(cpserver.
 
 - **API Server** (`internal/api/server.go`): chi router with middleware. Creates handler structs (`sandboxHandler`, `execHandler`, `filesHandler`, etc.) injected with `db.Queries` and the host agent Connect RPC client. Routes under `/v1/capsules/*`. Accepts `[]cpextension.Extension` — each extension's `RegisterRoutes()` is called after all core routes are registered.
 - **Reconciler** (`internal/api/reconciler.go`): background goroutine (every 30s) that compares DB records against `agent.ListSandboxes()` RPC. Marks orphaned DB entries as "stopped".
-- **Dashboard** (SvelteKit + Tailwind + Bits UI, statically built and embedded via `go:embed`, served as catch-all at root)
+- **Dashboard** (SvelteKit + Tailwind + Bits UI, built to static files in `frontend/build/`, served by Caddy as a reverse proxy)
 - **Database**: PostgreSQL via pgx/v5. Queries generated by sqlc from `db/queries/*.sql` → `pkg/db/`. Migrations in `db/migrations/` (goose, plain SQL). `db/migrations/embed.go` exposes `migrations.FS` so the cloud repo can run OSS migrations via `go:embed`.
 - **Config** (`pkg/config/config.go`): purely environment variables (`DATABASE_URL`, `CP_LISTEN_ADDR`, `CP_HOST_AGENT_ADDR`), no YAML/file config.
 
@@ -86,7 +86,9 @@ Startup (`cmd/control-plane/main.go`) is a thin wrapper: `cpserver.Run(cpserver.
 
 **Packages:** `internal/hostagent/`, `internal/sandbox/`, `internal/vm/`, `internal/network/`, `internal/devicemapper/`, `internal/envdclient/`, `internal/snapshot/`
 
-Startup (`cmd/host-agent/main.go`) wires: root check → enable IP forwarding → clean up stale dm devices → `sandbox.Manager` (containing `vm.Manager` + `network.SlotAllocator` + `devicemapper.LoopRegistry`) → `hostagent.Server` (Connect RPC handler) → HTTP server.
+**Production deployment:** `scripts/prepare-wrenn-user.sh` creates the `wrenn` system user, sets Linux capabilities (setcap) on wrenn-agent and all child binaries (iptables, losetup, dmsetup, etc.), installs an apt hook to restore capabilities after package updates, configures udev rules for `/dev/net/tun`, loads required kernel modules, and writes systemd unit files for both services. No sudo grants — all privilege is via capabilities.
+
+Startup (`cmd/host-agent/main.go`) wires: root/capabilities check → enable IP forwarding → clean up stale dm devices → `sandbox.Manager` (containing `vm.Manager` + `network.SlotAllocator` + `devicemapper.LoopRegistry`) → `hostagent.Server` (Connect RPC handler) → HTTP server.
 
 - **RPC Server** (`internal/hostagent/server.go`): implements `hostagentv1connect.HostAgentServiceHandler`. Thin wrapper — every method delegates to `sandbox.Manager`. Maps Connect error codes on return.
 - **Sandbox Manager** (`internal/sandbox/manager.go`): the core orchestration layer. Maintains in-memory state in `boxes map[string]*sandboxState` (protected by `sync.RWMutex`). Each `sandboxState` holds a `models.Sandbox`, a `*network.Slot`, and an `*envdclient.Client`. Runs a TTL reaper (every 10s) that auto-destroys timed-out sandboxes.
@@ -113,8 +115,8 @@ Runs as PID 1 inside the microVM via `wrenn-init.sh` (mounts procfs/sysfs/dev, s
 - **Package manager**: pnpm
 - **Routing**: SvelteKit file-based routing under `frontend/src/routes/`
 - **Routing layout**: `/login` and `/signup` at root, authenticated pages under `/dashboard/*` (e.g. `/dashboard/capsules`, `/dashboard/keys`)
-- **Build output**: `frontend/build/` → copied to `internal/dashboard/static/` → embedded via `go:embed` into the control plane binary
+- **Build output**: `frontend/build/` — static files served by Caddy
-- **Serving**: `internal/dashboard/dashboard.go` registers a `NotFound` catch-all SPA handler with fallback to `index.html`. API routes (`/v1/*`, `/openapi.yaml`, `/docs`) are registered first and take priority
+- **Serving**: Caddy reverse-proxies API requests to the control plane and serves the SvelteKit SPA directly. The control plane does not serve frontend assets.
 - **Dev workflow**: `make dev-frontend` runs Vite dev server on port 5173 with HMR. API calls proxy to `http://localhost:8000`
 - **Fonts**: Manrope (UI), Instrument Serif (headings), JetBrains Mono (code), Alice (brand wordmark) — all self-hosted via `@fontsource`
 - **Dark mode**: class-based (`.dark` on `<html>`) with system preference detection + localStorage persistence
@@ -209,7 +211,7 @@ To add a new query: add it to the appropriate `.sql` file in `db/queries/` → `
 - **TAP networking** (not vsock) for host-to-envd communication
 - **Device-mapper snapshots** for rootfs CoW — shared read-only loop device per base template, per-sandbox sparse CoW file, Firecracker gets `/dev/mapper/wrenn-{id}`
 - **PostgreSQL** via pgx/v5 + sqlc (type-safe query generation). Goose for migrations (plain SQL, up/down)
-- **Dashboard**: SvelteKit (Svelte 5, adapter-static) + Tailwind CSS v4 + Bits UI. Built to static files, embedded into the Go binary via `go:embed`, served as catch-all at root
+- **Dashboard**: SvelteKit (Svelte 5, adapter-static) + Tailwind CSS v4 + Bits UI. Built to static files in `frontend/build/`, served by Caddy (not embedded in the Go binary)
 - **Lago** for billing (external service, not in this codebase)
 
 ## Coding Conventions

README.md

@@ -2,16 +2,16 @@
 
 Secure infrastructure for AI
 
-## Deployment
+## Prerequisites
-
-### Prerequisites
 
 - Linux host with `/dev/kvm` access (bare metal or nested virt)
 - Firecracker binary at `/usr/local/bin/firecracker`
 - PostgreSQL
 - Go 1.25+
+- pnpm (for frontend)
+- Docker (for dev infra and rootfs builds)
 
-### Build
+## Build
 
 ```bash
 make build    # outputs to builds/
@@ -19,30 +19,77 @@ make build    # outputs to builds/
 
 Produces three binaries: `wrenn-cp` (control plane), `wrenn-agent` (host agent), `envd` (guest agent).
 
-### Host setup
+## Host setup
 
-The host agent machine needs:
+The host agent needs a kernel, a minimal rootfs image, and working directories on the host machine.
 
-```bash
+### Directory structure
-# Kernel for guest VMs
-mkdir -p /var/lib/wrenn/kernels
-# Place a vmlinux kernel at /var/lib/wrenn/kernels/vmlinux
 
-# Rootfs images
+```
-mkdir -p /var/lib/wrenn/images
+/var/lib/wrenn/
-# Build or place .ext4 rootfs images (e.g., minimal.ext4)
+├── kernels/
-
+│   └── vmlinux              # uncompressed Linux kernel (not bzImage)
-# Sandbox working directory
+├── images/
-mkdir -p /var/lib/wrenn/sandboxes
+│   └── minimal/
-
+│       └── rootfs.ext4      # base rootfs (all other templates snapshot from this)
-# Snapshots directory
+├── sandboxes/               # per-sandbox CoW files (created at runtime)
-mkdir -p /var/lib/wrenn/snapshots
+└── snapshots/               # pause/hibernate snapshot files (created at runtime)
-
-# Enable IP forwarding
-sysctl -w net.ipv4.ip_forward=1
 ```
 
-### Configure
+Create the directories:
+
+```bash
+sudo mkdir -p /var/lib/wrenn/{kernels,images/minimal,sandboxes,snapshots}
+```
+
+### Kernel
+
+Place an uncompressed `vmlinux` kernel at `/var/lib/wrenn/kernels/vmlinux`. Versioned kernels (`vmlinux-{semver}`) are also supported — the agent picks the latest by semver.
+
+### Minimal rootfs
+
+The minimal rootfs is the base image that all other templates (Python, Node, etc.) are built on top of via device-mapper snapshots. It must contain:
+
+| Package | Why |
+|---------|-----|
+| `socat` | Bidirectional relay for port forwarding |
+| `chrony` | Time sync from KVM PTP clock (`/dev/ptp0`) |
+| `tini` | PID 1 zombie reaper (injected by build script, not apt) |
+| `sudo` | User privilege management inside the guest |
+| `wget` | HTTP fetching |
+| `curl` | HTTP client |
+| `ca-certificates` | TLS certificate verification |
+
+**To build a rootfs from a Docker container:**
+
+1. Create and configure a container with the required packages:
+   ```bash
+   docker run -it --name wrenn-minimal debian:bookworm bash
+   # Inside the container:
+   apt update && apt install -y socat chrony sudo wget curl ca-certificates
+   exit
+   ```
+
+2. Export to a rootfs image (builds envd, injects wrenn-init + tini, shrinks to minimum size):
+   ```bash
+   sudo bash scripts/rootfs-from-container.sh wrenn-minimal minimal
+   ```
+
+**To update an existing rootfs** after changing envd or `wrenn-init.sh`:
+
+```bash
+bash scripts/update-minimal-rootfs.sh
+```
+
+This rebuilds envd via `make build-envd` and copies the fresh binaries into the mounted rootfs image.
+
+### IP forwarding
+
+```bash
+sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.ip_forward=1
+```
+
+## Configure
 
 Copy `.env.example` to `.env` and edit:
 
@@ -59,25 +106,21 @@ WRENN_HOST_LISTEN_ADDR=:50051
 WRENN_DIR=/var/lib/wrenn
 ```
 
-### Run
+## Development
 
 ```bash
-# Apply database migrations
+make dev          # Start PostgreSQL (Docker), run migrations, start control plane
-make migrate-up
+make dev-agent    # Start host agent (separate terminal, sudo)
-
+make dev-frontend # Vite dev server with HMR (port 5173)
-# Start control plane
+make check        # fmt + vet + lint + test
-./builds/wrenn-cp
 ```
 
-Control plane listens on `WRENN_CP_LISTEN_ADDR` (default `:8000`).
-
 ### Host registration
 
 Hosts must be registered with the control plane before they can serve sandboxes.
 
 1. **Create a host record** (via API or dashboard):
    ```bash
-   # As an admin (JWT auth)
    curl -X POST http://localhost:8000/v1/hosts \
      -H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT_TOKEN" \
      -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
@@ -87,17 +130,16 @@ Hosts must be registered with the control plane before they can serve sandboxes.
 
 2. **Start the host agent** with the registration token and its externally-reachable address:
    ```bash
-   sudo WRENN_CP_URL=http://cp-host:8000 \
+   sudo WRENN_CP_URL=http://localhost:8000 \
         ./builds/wrenn-agent \
         --register <token-from-step-1> \
-        --address 10.0.1.5:50051
+        --address <host-ip>:50051
    ```
    On first startup the agent sends its specs (arch, CPU, memory, disk) to the control plane, receives a long-lived host JWT, and saves it to `$WRENN_DIR/host-token`.
 
 3. **Subsequent startups** don't need `--register` — the agent loads the saved JWT automatically:
    ```bash
-   sudo WRENN_CP_URL=http://cp-host:8000 \
+   sudo ./builds/wrenn-agent --address <host-ip>:50051
-        ./builds/wrenn-agent --address 10.0.1.5:50051
    ```
 
 4. **If registration fails** (e.g., network error after token was consumed), regenerate a token:
@@ -107,23 +149,6 @@ Hosts must be registered with the control plane before they can serve sandboxes.
    ```
    Then restart the agent with the new token.
 
-The agent sends heartbeats to the control plane every 30 seconds. Host agent listens on `WRENN_HOST_LISTEN_ADDR` (default `:50051`).
+The agent sends heartbeats to the control plane every 30 seconds.
-
-### Rootfs images
-
-envd must be baked into every rootfs image. After building:
-
-```bash
-make build-envd
-bash scripts/update-debug-rootfs.sh /var/lib/wrenn/images/minimal.ext4
-```
-
-## Development
-
-```bash
-make dev          # Start PostgreSQL (Docker), run migrations, start control plane
-make dev-agent    # Start host agent (separate terminal, sudo)
-make check        # fmt + vet + lint + test
-```
 
 See `CLAUDE.md` for full architecture documentation.

cmd/host-agent/main.go

@@ -1,14 +1,18 @@
 package main
 
 import (
+	"bufio"
 	"context"
 	"crypto/tls"
 	"flag"
+	"fmt"
 	"log/slog"
 	"net/http"
 	"os"
 	"os/signal"
 	"path/filepath"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
 	"sync"
 	"syscall"
 	"time"
@@ -21,6 +25,7 @@ import (
 	"git.omukk.dev/wrenn/wrenn/internal/network"
 	"git.omukk.dev/wrenn/wrenn/internal/sandbox"
 	"git.omukk.dev/wrenn/wrenn/pkg/auth"
+	"git.omukk.dev/wrenn/wrenn/pkg/logging"
 	"git.omukk.dev/wrenn/wrenn/proto/hostagent/gen/hostagentv1connect"
 )
 
@@ -38,18 +43,24 @@ func main() {
 	advertiseAddr := flag.String("address", "", "Externally-reachable address (ip:port) for this host agent")
 	flag.Parse()
 
-	slog.SetDefault(slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(os.Stderr, &slog.HandlerOptions{
+	rootDir := envOrDefault("WRENN_DIR", "/var/lib/wrenn")
-		Level: slog.LevelDebug,
+	cleanupLog := logging.Setup(filepath.Join(rootDir, "logs"), "host-agent")
-	})))
+	defer cleanupLog()
 
-	if os.Geteuid() != 0 {
+	if err := checkPrivileges(); err != nil {
-		slog.Error("host agent must run as root")
+		slog.Error("insufficient privileges", "error", err)
 		os.Exit(1)
 	}
 
-	// Enable IP forwarding (required for NAT).
+	// Enable IP forwarding (required for NAT). The write may fail if running
+	// as non-root without DAC_OVERRIDE on this path — that's OK if the systemd
+	// unit's ExecStartPre already set it. We verify the value regardless.
 	if err := os.WriteFile("/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward", []byte("1"), 0644); err != nil {
-		slog.Warn("failed to enable ip_forward", "error", err)
+		slog.Warn("failed to enable ip_forward (may have been set by systemd unit)", "error", err)
+	}
+	if b, err := os.ReadFile("/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward"); err != nil || strings.TrimSpace(string(b)) != "1" {
+		slog.Error("ip_forward is not enabled — sandbox networking will be broken", "error", err)
+		os.Exit(1)
 	}
 
 	// Clean up stale resources from a previous crash.
@@ -57,7 +68,6 @@ func main() {
 	network.CleanupStaleNamespaces()
 
 	listenAddr := envOrDefault("WRENN_HOST_LISTEN_ADDR", ":50051")
-	rootDir := envOrDefault("WRENN_DIR", "/var/lib/wrenn")
 	cpURL := os.Getenv("WRENN_CP_URL")
 	credsFile := filepath.Join(rootDir, "host-credentials.json")
 
@@ -170,6 +180,7 @@ func main() {
 			shutdownCtx, shutdownCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)
 			defer shutdownCancel()
 			mgr.Shutdown(shutdownCtx)
+			sandbox.ShrinkMinimalImage(rootDir)
 			if err := httpServer.Shutdown(shutdownCtx); err != nil {
 				slog.Error("http server shutdown error", "error", err)
 			}
@@ -245,3 +256,63 @@ func envOrDefault(key, def string) string {
 	}
 	return def
 }
+
+// checkPrivileges verifies the process has the required Linux capabilities.
+// Always reads CapEff — even for root — because a root process inside a
+// restricted container (e.g. docker --cap-drop=all) may not have all caps.
+func checkPrivileges() error {
+	capEff, err := readEffectiveCaps()
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("read capabilities: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	// All capabilities required by the host agent at runtime.
+	required := []struct {
+		bit  uint
+		name string
+	}{
+		{1, "CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE"}, // /dev/loop*, /dev/mapper/*, /dev/net/tun
+		{5, "CAP_KILL"},         // SIGTERM/SIGKILL to Firecracker processes
+		{12, "CAP_NET_ADMIN"},   // netlink, iptables, routing, TAP/veth
+		{13, "CAP_NET_RAW"},     // raw sockets (iptables)
+		{19, "CAP_SYS_PTRACE"},  // reading /proc/self/ns/net (netns.Get)
+		{21, "CAP_SYS_ADMIN"},   // netns, mount ns, losetup, dmsetup
+		{27, "CAP_MKNOD"},       // device-mapper node creation
+	}
+
+	var missing []string
+	for _, cap := range required {
+		if capEff&(1<<cap.bit) == 0 {
+			missing = append(missing, cap.name)
+		}
+	}
+
+	if len(missing) > 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("missing capabilities: %s — run as root or apply setcap to the binary",
+			strings.Join(missing, ", "))
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// readEffectiveCaps parses the CapEff bitmask from /proc/self/status.
+func readEffectiveCaps() (uint64, error) {
+	f, err := os.Open("/proc/self/status")
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, err
+	}
+	defer f.Close()
+
+	scanner := bufio.NewScanner(f)
+	for scanner.Scan() {
+		line := scanner.Text()
+		if hexStr, ok := strings.CutPrefix(line, "CapEff:"); ok {
+			return strconv.ParseUint(strings.TrimSpace(hexStr), 16, 64)
+		}
+	}
+
+	if err := scanner.Err(); err != nil {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf("read /proc/self/status: %w", err)
+	}
+	return 0, fmt.Errorf("CapEff not found in /proc/self/status")
+}

deploy/logrotate/wrenn

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+/var/lib/wrenn/logs/control-plane.log
+/var/lib/wrenn/logs/host-agent.log
+{
+    daily
+    rotate 3
+    missingok
+    notifempty
+    dateext
+    dateformat -%Y-%m-%d
+    compress
+    delaycompress
+    sharedscripts
+    postrotate
+        # Signal the processes to reopen their log files.
+        # Use SIGHUP — both binaries handle it gracefully.
+        pkill -HUP -f wrenn-cp || true
+        pkill -HUP -f wrenn-agent || true
+    endscript
+}

frontend/src/routes/admin/capsules/[id]/+page.js

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+export const prerender = false;

internal/api/server.go

@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ var openapiYAML []byte
 type Server struct {
 	router   chi.Router
 	BuildSvc *service.BuildService
+	version  string
 }
 
 // New constructs the chi router and registers all routes.
@@ -48,6 +49,7 @@ func New(
 	mailer email.Mailer,
 	extensions []cpextension.Extension,
 	sctx cpextension.ServerContext,
+	version string,
 ) *Server {
 	r := chi.NewRouter()
 	r.Use(requestLogger())
@@ -86,6 +88,12 @@ func New(
 	adminCapsules := newAdminCapsuleHandler(sandboxSvc, queries, pool, al)
 	meH := newMeHandler(queries, pgPool, rdb, jwtSecret, mailer, oauthRegistry, oauthRedirectURL, teamSvc)
 
+	// Health check.
+	r.Get("/health", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+		fmt.Fprintf(w, `{"status":"ok","version":%q}`, version)
+	})
+
 	// OpenAPI spec and docs.
 	r.Get("/openapi.yaml", serveOpenAPI)
 	r.Get("/docs", serveDocs)
@@ -270,7 +278,7 @@ func New(
 		ext.RegisterRoutes(r, sctx)
 	}
 
-	return &Server{router: r, BuildSvc: buildSvc}
+	return &Server{router: r, BuildSvc: buildSvc, version: version}
 }
 
 // Handler returns the HTTP handler.

internal/network/allocator.go

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ func (a *SlotAllocator) Allocate() (int, error) {
 	a.mu.Lock()
 	defer a.mu.Unlock()
 
-	for i := 1; i <= 65534; i++ {
+	for i := 1; i <= 32767; i++ {
 		if !a.inUse[i] {
 			a.inUse[i] = true
 			return i, nil

internal/sandbox/images.go

@@ -104,6 +104,37 @@ func ParseSizeToMB(s string) (int, error) {
 	}
 }
 
+// ShrinkMinimalImage shrinks the built-in minimal rootfs back to its minimum
+// size using resize2fs -M. This is the inverse of EnsureImageSizes and should
+// be called during graceful shutdown so the image is stored compactly on disk.
+func ShrinkMinimalImage(wrennDir string) {
+	minimalRootfs := layout.TemplateRootfs(wrennDir, id.PlatformTeamID, id.MinimalTemplateID)
+	shrinkImage(minimalRootfs)
+}
+
+// shrinkImage shrinks a single rootfs image to its minimum size.
+func shrinkImage(rootfs string) {
+	if _, err := os.Stat(rootfs); err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	slog.Info("shrinking base image", "path", rootfs)
+
+	if out, err := exec.Command("e2fsck", "-fy", rootfs).CombinedOutput(); err != nil {
+		if exitErr, ok := err.(*exec.ExitError); ok && exitErr.ExitCode() > 1 {
+			slog.Warn("e2fsck before shrink failed", "path", rootfs, "output", string(out), "error", err)
+			return
+		}
+	}
+
+	if out, err := exec.Command("resize2fs", "-M", rootfs).CombinedOutput(); err != nil {
+		slog.Warn("resize2fs -M failed", "path", rootfs, "output", string(out), "error", err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	slog.Info("base image shrunk", "path", rootfs)
+}
+
 // expandImage expands a single rootfs image if it is smaller than targetBytes.
 func expandImage(rootfs string, targetBytes int64, targetMB int) error {
 	info, err := os.Stat(rootfs)

pkg/config/config.go

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ type Config struct {
 	RedisURL    string
 	ListenAddr  string
 	JWTSecret   string
+	WrennDir    string // WRENN_DIR — base directory for wrenn data (logs, etc.)
 
 	// mTLS — CP→Agent channel. Both must be set to enable mTLS; omitting either
 	// disables cert issuance and leaves agent connections on plain HTTP (dev mode).
@@ -48,6 +49,7 @@ func Load() Config {
 		RedisURL:    envOrDefault("REDIS_URL", "redis://localhost:6379/0"),
 		ListenAddr:  envOrDefault("WRENN_CP_LISTEN_ADDR", ":8080"),
 		JWTSecret:   os.Getenv("JWT_SECRET"),
+		WrennDir:    envOrDefault("WRENN_DIR", "/var/lib/wrenn"),
 
 		CACert: os.Getenv("WRENN_CA_CERT"),
 		CAKey:  os.Getenv("WRENN_CA_KEY"),

pkg/cpserver/run.go

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import (
 	"net/http"
 	"os"
 	"os/signal"
+	"path/filepath"
 	"strings"
 	"syscall"
 	"time"
@@ -22,6 +23,7 @@ import (
 	"git.omukk.dev/wrenn/wrenn/pkg/config"
 	"git.omukk.dev/wrenn/wrenn/pkg/db"
 	"git.omukk.dev/wrenn/wrenn/pkg/lifecycle"
+	"git.omukk.dev/wrenn/wrenn/pkg/logging"
 	"git.omukk.dev/wrenn/wrenn/pkg/scheduler"
 )
 
@@ -39,11 +41,9 @@ func Run(opts ...Option) {
 		opt(o)
 	}
 
-	slog.SetDefault(slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(os.Stderr, &slog.HandlerOptions{
-		Level: slog.LevelDebug,
-	})))
-
 	cfg := config.Load()
+	cleanupLog := logging.Setup(filepath.Join(cfg.WrennDir, "logs"), "control-plane")
+	defer cleanupLog()
 
 	if len(cfg.JWTSecret) < 32 {
 		slog.Error("JWT_SECRET must be at least 32 characters")
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ func Run(opts ...Option) {
 	}
 
 	// API server.
-	srv := api.New(queries, hostPool, hostScheduler, pool, rdb, []byte(cfg.JWTSecret), oauthRegistry, cfg.OAuthRedirectURL, ca, al, channelSvc, mailer, o.extensions, sctx)
+	srv := api.New(queries, hostPool, hostScheduler, pool, rdb, []byte(cfg.JWTSecret), oauthRegistry, cfg.OAuthRedirectURL, ca, al, channelSvc, mailer, o.extensions, sctx, o.version)
 
 	// Start template build workers (2 concurrent).
 	stopBuildWorkers := srv.BuildSvc.StartWorkers(ctx, 2)

pkg/logging/logging.go

@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+package logging
+
+import (
+	"io"
+	"log/slog"
+	"os"
+	"os/signal"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"syscall"
+)
+
+// Setup configures the global slog logger with dual output (stderr + rotating
+// log file). logsDir is the directory where log files are written. binaryName
+// is used as the log filename (e.g. "control-plane" → "control-plane.log").
+//
+// If logsDir is empty or the directory cannot be created, Setup falls back to
+// stderr-only logging and returns a no-op cleanup function.
+//
+// The returned cleanup function closes the log file and must be deferred.
+// Setup also installs a SIGHUP handler that reopens the log file, allowing
+// external log rotation tools (e.g. logrotate) to rotate files in place.
+func Setup(logsDir, binaryName string) func() {
+	level := parseLevel(os.Getenv("LOG_LEVEL"))
+
+	if logsDir == "" {
+		slog.SetDefault(slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(os.Stderr, &slog.HandlerOptions{
+			Level: level,
+		})))
+		return func() {}
+	}
+
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(logsDir, 0750); err != nil {
+		// Fall back to stderr-only; log the error so operators notice.
+		slog.SetDefault(slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(os.Stderr, &slog.HandlerOptions{
+			Level: level,
+		})))
+		slog.Warn("file logging unavailable: failed to create log directory", "dir", logsDir, "error", err)
+		return func() {}
+	}
+
+	logPath := filepath.Join(logsDir, binaryName+".log")
+	rf, err := newReopenableFile(logPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		slog.SetDefault(slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(os.Stderr, &slog.HandlerOptions{
+			Level: level,
+		})))
+		slog.Warn("file logging unavailable: failed to open log file", "path", logPath, "error", err)
+		return func() {}
+	}
+
+	mw := io.MultiWriter(os.Stderr, rf)
+	slog.SetDefault(slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(mw, &slog.HandlerOptions{
+		Level: level,
+	})))
+
+	// SIGHUP reopens the log file so logrotate can rotate in place.
+	sigCh := make(chan os.Signal, 1)
+	signal.Notify(sigCh, syscall.SIGHUP)
+	go func() {
+		for range sigCh {
+			if err := rf.Reopen(); err != nil {
+				slog.Error("failed to reopen log file on SIGHUP", "path", logPath, "error", err)
+			} else {
+				slog.Info("log file reopened", "path", logPath)
+			}
+		}
+	}()
+
+	return func() {
+		signal.Stop(sigCh)
+		close(sigCh)
+		rf.Close()
+	}
+}
+
+func parseLevel(s string) slog.Level {
+	switch strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(s)) {
+	case "debug":
+		return slog.LevelDebug
+	case "warn", "warning":
+		return slog.LevelWarn
+	case "error":
+		return slog.LevelError
+	default:
+		return slog.LevelInfo
+	}
+}
+
+// reopenableFile is an io.Writer backed by an *os.File that can be atomically
+// reopened (for log rotation via SIGHUP). All operations are goroutine-safe.
+type reopenableFile struct {
+	path string
+	mu   sync.Mutex
+	f    *os.File
+}
+
+func newReopenableFile(path string) (*reopenableFile, error) {
+	f, err := os.OpenFile(path, os.O_CREATE|os.O_APPEND|os.O_WRONLY, 0640)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return &reopenableFile{path: path, f: f}, nil
+}
+
+func (r *reopenableFile) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
+	r.mu.Lock()
+	defer r.mu.Unlock()
+	return r.f.Write(p)
+}
+
+// Reopen closes the current file and opens a new one at the same path.
+// This is the mechanism that makes logrotate's copytruncate-free rotation work:
+// logrotate renames the old file, then sends SIGHUP, and the process opens a
+// fresh file at the original path.
+func (r *reopenableFile) Reopen() error {
+	r.mu.Lock()
+	defer r.mu.Unlock()
+	// Open the new file before closing the old one so a failed open doesn't
+	// leave the writer in a broken state with a closed fd.
+	f, err := os.OpenFile(r.path, os.O_CREATE|os.O_APPEND|os.O_WRONLY, 0640)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	r.f.Close()
+	r.f = f
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (r *reopenableFile) Close() error {
+	r.mu.Lock()
+	defer r.mu.Unlock()
+	return r.f.Close()
+}

scripts/prepare-wrenn-user.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,385 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+#
+# prepare-wrenn-user.sh — Create the wrenn system user and configure minimal privileges.
+#
+# Creates a locked-down 'wrenn' system user that can run wrenn-agent and wrenn-cp
+# with only the privileges they need. The agent binary gets Linux capabilities
+# via setcap — no sudo is configured for the wrenn user at all. If an attacker
+# compromises the wrenn user, they cannot escalate via sudo.
+#
+# What this script does:
+#   1. Creates the 'wrenn' system user (bash shell for debugging, no home dir)
+#   2. Creates required directories with correct ownership
+#   3. Sets Linux capabilities on wrenn-agent and all child binaries
+#   4. Installs an apt hook to restore capabilities after package updates
+#   5. Installs a sudoers drop-in (comment-only, no grants — absence is the cage)
+#   6. Ensures required kernel modules are loaded
+#   7. Writes systemd unit files for both wrenn-agent and wrenn-cp
+#
+# Usage:
+#   sudo bash scripts/prepare-wrenn-user.sh
+#
+# Prerequisites:
+#   - wrenn-agent binary at /usr/local/bin/wrenn-agent
+#   - wrenn-cp binary at /usr/local/bin/wrenn-cp
+#   - firecracker binary at /usr/local/bin/firecracker
+#   - libcap2-bin installed (for setcap)
+
+set -euo pipefail
+
+# ── Guard ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+if [[ $EUID -ne 0 ]]; then
+    echo "ERROR: This script must be run as root."
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+# ── Configuration ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+WRENN_USER="wrenn"
+WRENN_GROUP="wrenn"
+WRENN_DIR="/var/lib/wrenn"
+AGENT_BIN="/usr/local/bin/wrenn-agent"
+CP_BIN="/usr/local/bin/wrenn-cp"
+FC_BIN="/usr/local/bin/firecracker"
+RESTORE_CAPS_SCRIPT="/etc/wrenn/restore-caps.sh"
+
+# ── 1. Create system user ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+if id "${WRENN_USER}" &>/dev/null; then
+    echo "==> User '${WRENN_USER}' already exists, skipping creation."
+else
+    echo "==> Creating system user '${WRENN_USER}'..."
+    useradd \
+        --system \
+        --no-create-home \
+        --home-dir "${WRENN_DIR}" \
+        --shell /bin/bash \
+        "${WRENN_USER}"
+fi
+
+# Add wrenn to kvm group for /dev/kvm access.
+if getent group kvm &>/dev/null; then
+    usermod -aG kvm "${WRENN_USER}"
+    echo "==> Added '${WRENN_USER}' to 'kvm' group."
+fi
+
+# ── 2. Create directories with correct ownership ────────────────────────────
+
+echo "==> Setting up directories..."
+
+directories=(
+    "${WRENN_DIR}"
+    "${WRENN_DIR}/images"
+    "${WRENN_DIR}/kernels"
+    "${WRENN_DIR}/sandboxes"
+    "${WRENN_DIR}/snapshots"
+    "${WRENN_DIR}/logs"
+    "/run/netns"
+)
+
+for dir in "${directories[@]}"; do
+    mkdir -p "${dir}"
+done
+
+# Only chown wrenn-owned dirs (not /run/netns which is system-managed).
+for dir in "${WRENN_DIR}" "${WRENN_DIR}/images" "${WRENN_DIR}/kernels" \
+           "${WRENN_DIR}/sandboxes" "${WRENN_DIR}/snapshots" "${WRENN_DIR}/logs"; do
+    chown "${WRENN_USER}:${WRENN_GROUP}" "${dir}"
+    chmod 750 "${dir}"
+done
+
+# ── 3. Set capabilities on binaries ─────────────────────────────────────────
+#
+# These capabilities replace full root access. The wrenn-agent binary gets
+# exactly the capabilities it needs for:
+#
+#   CAP_SYS_ADMIN   — network namespaces (netns create/enter), mount namespaces
+#                     (unshare -m), losetup, dmsetup, mount/umount
+#   CAP_NET_ADMIN   — veth/TAP creation (netlink), iptables rules, IP forwarding,
+#                     routing table manipulation
+#   CAP_NET_RAW     — raw socket access (needed by iptables internally)
+#   CAP_SYS_PTRACE  — reading /proc/self/ns/net (netns.Get)
+#   CAP_KILL        — sending SIGTERM/SIGKILL to Firecracker processes
+#   CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE — accessing /dev/loop*, /dev/mapper/*, /dev/net/tun,
+#                      /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward
+#   CAP_MKNOD       — creating device nodes (dm-snapshot)
+#
+# The 'ep' suffix means Effective + Permitted (granted at exec time).
+
+echo "==> Setting capabilities on wrenn-agent..."
+
+if [[ ! -f "${AGENT_BIN}" ]]; then
+    echo "WARNING: ${AGENT_BIN} not found, skipping setcap. Install the binary first."
+else
+    setcap \
+        cap_sys_admin,cap_net_admin,cap_net_raw,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_kill,cap_dac_override,cap_mknod+ep \
+        "${AGENT_BIN}"
+
+    echo "    Capabilities set on ${AGENT_BIN}:"
+    getcap "${AGENT_BIN}"
+fi
+
+# Firecracker also needs capabilities when spawned by a non-root parent.
+# CAP_NET_ADMIN is required for network device access inside the netns.
+if [[ -f "${FC_BIN}" ]]; then
+    setcap cap_net_admin,cap_sys_admin,cap_dac_override+ep "${FC_BIN}"
+    echo "    Capabilities set on ${FC_BIN}:"
+    getcap "${FC_BIN}"
+fi
+
+# ── Helper: resolve binary path and apply setcap ────────────────────────────
+#
+# Uses `command -v` to find the binary in PATH (handles /usr/bin vs /usr/sbin
+# differences across distros), then `readlink -f` to resolve symlinks so that
+# setcap hits the real inode (important for iptables-nft/alternatives).
+
+setcap_binary() {
+    local name="$1" caps="$2"
+    local bin
+    bin=$(command -v "$name" 2>/dev/null) || {
+        echo "    WARNING: ${name} not found in PATH, skipping."
+        return 0
+    }
+    bin=$(readlink -f "$bin")
+    setcap "$caps" "$bin"
+    echo "    $(getcap "$bin")"
+}
+
+# The child binaries invoked by wrenn-agent (iptables, losetup, dmsetup, etc.)
+# also need capabilities since they'll be exec'd by a non-root user.
+echo "==> Setting capabilities on child binaries..."
+
+setcap_binary iptables      "cap_net_admin,cap_net_raw+ep"
+setcap_binary iptables-save "cap_net_admin,cap_net_raw+ep"
+setcap_binary ip            "cap_sys_admin,cap_net_admin+ep"
+setcap_binary sysctl        "cap_net_admin+ep"
+setcap_binary losetup       "cap_sys_admin,cap_dac_override+ep"
+setcap_binary blockdev      "cap_sys_admin,cap_dac_override+ep"
+setcap_binary dmsetup       "cap_sys_admin,cap_dac_override,cap_mknod+ep"
+setcap_binary e2fsck        "cap_sys_admin,cap_dac_override+ep"
+setcap_binary resize2fs     "cap_sys_admin,cap_dac_override+ep"
+setcap_binary dd            "cap_dac_override+ep"
+setcap_binary unshare       "cap_sys_admin+ep"
+setcap_binary mount         "cap_sys_admin,cap_dac_override+ep"
+
+# ── 4. Persist capabilities across package updates ──────────────────────────
+#
+# apt/dpkg overwrites binaries on package updates, which strips the xattr-based
+# capabilities set by setcap. This installs:
+#   - /etc/wrenn/restore-caps.sh: re-applies setcap to all child binaries
+#   - /etc/apt/apt.conf.d/99-wrenn-setcap: apt post-invoke hook that calls it
+
+echo "==> Installing capability restore hook..."
+
+mkdir -p /etc/wrenn
+
+cat > "${RESTORE_CAPS_SCRIPT}" << 'RESTORE'
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+#
+# restore-caps.sh — Re-apply Linux capabilities to wrenn child binaries.
+# Called automatically by apt after package updates (see /etc/apt/apt.conf.d/99-wrenn-setcap).
+# Can also be run manually: sudo /etc/wrenn/restore-caps.sh
+
+set -euo pipefail
+
+setcap_binary() {
+    local name="$1" caps="$2"
+    local bin
+    bin=$(command -v "$name" 2>/dev/null) || return 0
+    bin=$(readlink -f "$bin")
+    setcap "$caps" "$bin" 2>/dev/null || true
+}
+
+# wrenn-agent and firecracker (only if present — they aren't package-managed).
+[[ -f /usr/local/bin/wrenn-agent ]] && \
+    setcap cap_sys_admin,cap_net_admin,cap_net_raw,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_kill,cap_dac_override,cap_mknod+ep \
+        /usr/local/bin/wrenn-agent 2>/dev/null || true
+[[ -f /usr/local/bin/firecracker ]] && \
+    setcap cap_net_admin,cap_sys_admin,cap_dac_override+ep \
+        /usr/local/bin/firecracker 2>/dev/null || true
+
+# Child binaries (these are the ones wiped by apt).
+setcap_binary iptables      "cap_net_admin,cap_net_raw+ep"
+setcap_binary iptables-save "cap_net_admin,cap_net_raw+ep"
+setcap_binary ip            "cap_sys_admin,cap_net_admin+ep"
+setcap_binary sysctl        "cap_net_admin+ep"
+setcap_binary losetup       "cap_sys_admin,cap_dac_override+ep"
+setcap_binary blockdev      "cap_sys_admin,cap_dac_override+ep"
+setcap_binary dmsetup       "cap_sys_admin,cap_dac_override,cap_mknod+ep"
+setcap_binary e2fsck        "cap_sys_admin,cap_dac_override+ep"
+setcap_binary resize2fs     "cap_sys_admin,cap_dac_override+ep"
+setcap_binary dd            "cap_dac_override+ep"
+setcap_binary unshare       "cap_sys_admin+ep"
+setcap_binary mount         "cap_sys_admin,cap_dac_override+ep"
+RESTORE
+
+chmod 755 "${RESTORE_CAPS_SCRIPT}"
+
+cat > /etc/apt/apt.conf.d/99-wrenn-setcap << 'APT'
+// Re-apply Linux capabilities to wrenn child binaries after any package update.
+// Capabilities (xattr) are stripped when dpkg overwrites a binary.
+DPkg::Post-Invoke { "/etc/wrenn/restore-caps.sh"; };
+APT
+
+echo "    Installed ${RESTORE_CAPS_SCRIPT} and apt post-invoke hook."
+
+# ── 5. Device access ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+#
+# /dev/kvm   — handled by kvm group membership above
+# /dev/net/tun — needs to be accessible by wrenn user
+
+echo "==> Configuring device access..."
+
+# Ensure /dev/net/tun is accessible (udev rule for persistence across reboots).
+cat > /etc/udev/rules.d/99-wrenn.rules << 'UDEV'
+# Allow wrenn user access to TUN device for TAP networking.
+SUBSYSTEM=="misc", KERNEL=="tun", GROUP="wrenn", MODE="0660"
+UDEV
+
+udevadm control --reload-rules 2>/dev/null || true
+echo "    Installed udev rule for /dev/net/tun."
+
+# ── 6. Kernel modules ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+echo "==> Ensuring kernel modules are loaded..."
+
+modules=(dm_snapshot dm_mod loop tun)
+for mod in "${modules[@]}"; do
+    if ! lsmod | grep -q "^${mod}"; then
+        modprobe "${mod}" 2>/dev/null && echo "    Loaded ${mod}" || echo "    WARNING: Could not load ${mod}"
+    else
+        echo "    ${mod} already loaded."
+    fi
+done
+
+# Persist across reboots.
+for mod in "${modules[@]}"; do
+    grep -qxF "${mod}" /etc/modules-load.d/wrenn.conf 2>/dev/null || echo "${mod}" >> /etc/modules-load.d/wrenn.conf
+done
+echo "    Module persistence written to /etc/modules-load.d/wrenn.conf."
+
+# ── 7. Sudoers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+#
+# The wrenn user has no sudo grants. The absence of a grant is the cage — an
+# explicit "!ALL" deny is weaker due to known bypasses (CVE-2019-14287).
+# This file exists purely as documentation for operators running `sudo -l`.
+
+echo "==> Writing sudoers drop-in..."
+
+cat > /etc/sudoers.d/wrenn << 'SUDOERS'
+# Wrenn system user — no sudo access permitted.
+# All privilege is granted via Linux capabilities on specific binaries (setcap).
+# This file contains no active rules. The absence of any grant is intentional
+# and is the strongest way to deny escalation.
+#
+# Do not add rules here. If the wrenn user needs new privileges, use setcap
+# on the specific binary instead.
+SUDOERS
+
+chmod 440 /etc/sudoers.d/wrenn
+visudo -c -f /etc/sudoers.d/wrenn
+echo "    /etc/sudoers.d/wrenn installed and validated."
+
+# ── 8. Systemd units ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+echo "==> Writing systemd service files..."
+
+cat > /etc/systemd/system/wrenn-agent.service << 'UNIT'
+[Unit]
+Description=Wrenn Host Agent
+After=network-online.target
+Wants=network-online.target
+
+[Service]
+Type=simple
+User=wrenn
+Group=wrenn
+EnvironmentFile=-/etc/wrenn/agent.env
+
+# The binary has capabilities set via setcap. These systemd directives ensure
+# the capabilities are inherited into the process at exec time.
+AmbientCapabilities=CAP_SYS_ADMIN CAP_NET_ADMIN CAP_NET_RAW CAP_SYS_PTRACE CAP_KILL CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE CAP_MKNOD
+CapabilityBoundingSet=CAP_SYS_ADMIN CAP_NET_ADMIN CAP_NET_RAW CAP_SYS_PTRACE CAP_KILL CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE CAP_MKNOD
+
+# IMPORTANT: must be false — child binaries (iptables, losetup, dmsetup, etc.)
+# have their own file capabilities via setcap which must be honored at exec time.
+NoNewPrivileges=false
+
+# Enable IP forwarding before the agent starts. The "+" prefix runs this
+# directive as root (bypassing User=wrenn) so it can write to procfs.
+ExecStartPre=+/bin/sh -c 'sysctl -w net.ipv4.ip_forward=1'
+
+ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/wrenn-agent --address ${WRENN_ADVERTISE_ADDR}
+
+Restart=on-failure
+RestartSec=5
+
+# File descriptor limits (Firecracker + loop devices + sockets).
+LimitNOFILE=65536
+LimitNPROC=4096
+
+# Protect host filesystem — only allow access to what's needed.
+ProtectHome=true
+ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/wrenn /tmp /run/netns /dev/mapper
+ReadOnlyPaths=/usr/local/bin/firecracker
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target
+UNIT
+
+cat > /etc/systemd/system/wrenn-cp.service << 'UNIT'
+[Unit]
+Description=Wrenn Control Plane
+After=network-online.target postgresql.service
+Wants=network-online.target
+
+[Service]
+Type=simple
+User=wrenn
+Group=wrenn
+EnvironmentFile=-/etc/wrenn/cp.env
+
+# Control plane is fully unprivileged — no capabilities needed.
+NoNewPrivileges=true
+CapabilityBoundingSet=
+
+ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/wrenn-cp
+
+Restart=on-failure
+RestartSec=5
+
+ProtectHome=true
+ProtectSystem=strict
+ReadWritePaths=/tmp
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target
+UNIT
+
+mkdir -p /etc/wrenn
+touch /etc/wrenn/agent.env /etc/wrenn/cp.env
+chmod 640 /etc/wrenn/agent.env /etc/wrenn/cp.env
+chown root:${WRENN_GROUP} /etc/wrenn/agent.env /etc/wrenn/cp.env
+
+systemctl daemon-reload
+echo "    wrenn-agent.service and wrenn-cp.service installed."
+
+# ── Done ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+echo ""
+echo "=== Setup complete ==="
+echo ""
+echo "Next steps:"
+echo "  1. Copy wrenn-agent and wrenn-cp binaries to /usr/local/bin/"
+echo "  2. Edit /etc/wrenn/agent.env with WRENN_CP_URL and WRENN_ADVERTISE_ADDR"
+echo "  3. Edit /etc/wrenn/cp.env with DATABASE_URL and other control plane config"
+echo "  4. systemctl enable --now wrenn-agent"
+echo "  5. systemctl enable --now wrenn-cp"
+echo ""
+echo "Security summary:"
+echo "  - wrenn user: bash shell (for debugging), no home, no sudo (no grants in sudoers)"
+echo "  - wrenn-agent: runs as wrenn with 7 capabilities via setcap (not root)"
+echo "  - wrenn-cp: runs as wrenn with zero capabilities"
+echo "  - Capabilities auto-restored after apt upgrades via /etc/wrenn/restore-caps.sh"
+echo ""