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0
forked from wrenn/wrenn
Files
wrenn-releases/internal/api/handler_sandbox_proxy.go
pptx704 25ce0729d5 Add mTLS to CP→agent channel
- Internal ECDSA P-256 CA (WRENN_CA_CERT/WRENN_CA_KEY env vars); when absent
  the system falls back to plain HTTP so dev mode works without certificates
- Host leaf cert (7-day TTL, IP SAN) issued at registration and renewed on
  every JWT refresh; fingerprint + expiry stored in DB (cert_expires_at column
  replaces the removed mtls_enabled flag)
- CP ephemeral client cert (24-hour TTL) via CPCertStore with atomic hot-swap;
  background goroutine renews it every 12 hours without restarting the server
- Host agent uses tls.Listen + httpServer.Serve so GetCertificate callback is
  respected (ListenAndServeTLS always reads cert from disk)
- Sandbox reverse proxy now uses pool.Transport() so it shares the same TLS
  config as the Connect RPC clients instead of http.DefaultTransport
- Credentials file renamed host-credentials.json with cert_pem/key_pem/
  ca_cert_pem fields; duplicate register/refresh response structs collapsed
  to authResponse
2026-03-30 21:24:35 +06:00

159 lines
4.3 KiB
Go

package api
import (
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/http/httputil"
"net/url"
"regexp"
"strconv"
"strings"
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgtype"
"git.omukk.dev/wrenn/sandbox/internal/auth"
"git.omukk.dev/wrenn/sandbox/internal/db"
"git.omukk.dev/wrenn/sandbox/internal/id"
"git.omukk.dev/wrenn/sandbox/internal/lifecycle"
)
// sandboxHostPattern matches hostnames like "49999-cl-abcd1234.localhost" or
// "49999-cl-abcd1234.example.com". Captures: port, sandbox ID.
var sandboxHostPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`^(\d+)-(cl-[0-9a-z]+)\.`)
// SandboxProxyWrapper wraps an existing HTTP handler and intercepts requests
// whose Host header matches the {port}-{sandbox_id}.{domain} pattern. Matching
// requests are reverse-proxied through the host agent that owns the sandbox.
// All other requests are passed through to the inner handler.
//
// Authentication is via X-API-Key header only (no JWT). The API key's team
// must own the sandbox.
type SandboxProxyWrapper struct {
inner http.Handler
db *db.Queries
pool *lifecycle.HostClientPool
transport http.RoundTripper
}
// NewSandboxProxyWrapper creates a new proxy wrapper.
func NewSandboxProxyWrapper(inner http.Handler, queries *db.Queries, pool *lifecycle.HostClientPool) *SandboxProxyWrapper {
return &SandboxProxyWrapper{
inner: inner,
db: queries,
pool: pool,
transport: pool.Transport(),
}
}
func (h *SandboxProxyWrapper) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
host := r.Host
// Strip port from Host header (e.g. "49999-cl-abcd1234.localhost:8000" → "49999-cl-abcd1234.localhost")
if colonIdx := strings.LastIndex(host, ":"); colonIdx != -1 {
host = host[:colonIdx]
}
matches := sandboxHostPattern.FindStringSubmatch(host)
if matches == nil {
h.inner.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
port := matches[1]
sandboxIDStr := matches[2]
// Validate port.
portNum, err := strconv.Atoi(port)
if err != nil || portNum < 1 || portNum > 65535 {
http.Error(w, "invalid port", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// Authenticate: require API key or JWT, extract team ID.
teamID, err := h.authenticateRequest(r)
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "unauthorized", err.Error())
return
}
sandboxID, err := id.ParseSandboxID(sandboxIDStr)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "invalid sandbox ID", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
ctx := r.Context()
// Look up sandbox and verify ownership.
sb, err := h.db.GetSandboxByTeam(ctx, db.GetSandboxByTeamParams{
ID: sandboxID,
TeamID: teamID,
})
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "sandbox not found", http.StatusNotFound)
return
}
if sb.Status != "running" {
http.Error(w, fmt.Sprintf("sandbox is not running (status: %s)", sb.Status), http.StatusConflict)
return
}
agentHost, err := h.db.GetHost(ctx, sb.HostID)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "host agent not found", http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
return
}
if agentHost.Address == "" {
http.Error(w, "host agent has no address", http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
return
}
agentAddr := h.pool.ResolveAddr(agentHost.Address)
upstreamPath := fmt.Sprintf("/proxy/%s/%s%s", sandboxIDStr, port, r.URL.Path)
target, err := url.Parse(agentAddr)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "invalid host agent address", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
proxy := &httputil.ReverseProxy{
Transport: h.transport,
Director: func(req *http.Request) {
req.URL.Scheme = target.Scheme
req.URL.Host = target.Host
req.URL.Path = upstreamPath
req.URL.RawQuery = r.URL.RawQuery
req.Host = target.Host
},
ErrorHandler: func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, err error) {
slog.Debug("sandbox proxy error",
"sandbox_id", sandboxIDStr,
"port", port,
"error", err,
)
http.Error(w, "proxy error: "+err.Error(), http.StatusBadGateway)
},
}
proxy.ServeHTTP(w, r)
}
// authenticateRequest validates the request's API key and returns the team ID.
// Only API key authentication is supported for sandbox proxy requests (not JWT).
func (h *SandboxProxyWrapper) authenticateRequest(r *http.Request) (pgtype.UUID, error) {
key := r.Header.Get("X-API-Key")
if key == "" {
return pgtype.UUID{}, fmt.Errorf("X-API-Key header required")
}
hash := auth.HashAPIKey(key)
row, err := h.db.GetAPIKeyByHash(r.Context(), hash)
if err != nil {
return pgtype.UUID{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid API key")
}
return row.TeamID, nil
}