forked from wrenn/wrenn
pptx704
9bf67aa7f7
Replaces the hardcoded CP_HOST_AGENT_ADDR single-agent setup with a DB-driven registration system supporting multiple host agents (BYOC). Key changes: - Host agents register via one-time token, receive a 7-day JWT + 60-day refresh token; heartbeat loop auto-refreshes on 401/403 and pauses all sandboxes if refresh fails - HostClientPool: lazy Connect RPC client cache keyed by host ID, replacing the single static agent client throughout the API and service layers - RoundRobinScheduler: picks an online host for each new sandbox via ListActiveHosts; extensible for future scheduling strategies - HostMonitor (replaces Reconciler): passive heartbeat staleness check marks hosts unreachable and sandboxes missing after 90s; active reconciliation per online host restores missing-but-alive sandboxes and stops orphans - Graceful host delete: returns 409 with affected sandbox list without ?force=true; force-delete destroys sandboxes then evicts pool client - Snapshot delete broadcasts to all online hosts (templates have no host_id) - sandbox.Manager.PauseAll: pauses all running VMs on CP connectivity loss - New migration: host_refresh_tokens table with token rotation (issue-then- revoke ordering to prevent lockout on mid-rotation crash) - New sandbox status 'missing' (reversible, unlike 'stopped') and host status 'unreachable'; both reflected in OpenAPI spec - Fix: refresh token auth failure now returns 401 (was 400 via generic 'invalid' substring match in serviceErrToHTTP)
108 lines
3.3 KiB
Go
108 lines
3.3 KiB
Go
package auth
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import (
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"fmt"
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"time"
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"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
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)
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const jwtExpiry = 6 * time.Hour
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const hostJWTExpiry = 7 * 24 * time.Hour // 7 days; host refreshes via refresh token
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const HostRefreshTokenExpiry = 60 * 24 * time.Hour // 60 days; exported for service layer
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// Claims are the JWT payload for user tokens.
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type Claims struct {
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Type string `json:"typ,omitempty"` // empty for user tokens; used to reject host tokens
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TeamID string `json:"team_id"`
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Role string `json:"role"` // owner, admin, or member within TeamID
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Email string `json:"email"`
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Name string `json:"name"`
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jwt.RegisteredClaims
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}
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// SignJWT signs a new 6-hour JWT for the given user.
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func SignJWT(secret []byte, userID, teamID, email, name, role string) (string, error) {
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now := time.Now()
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claims := Claims{
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TeamID: teamID,
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Role: role,
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Email: email,
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Name: name,
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RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
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Subject: userID,
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IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(now),
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ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(now.Add(jwtExpiry)),
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},
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}
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token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodHS256, claims)
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return token.SignedString(secret)
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}
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// VerifyJWT parses and validates a user JWT, returning the claims on success.
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// Rejects host JWTs (which carry a "typ" claim) to prevent cross-token confusion.
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func VerifyJWT(secret []byte, tokenStr string) (Claims, error) {
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token, err := jwt.ParseWithClaims(tokenStr, &Claims{}, func(t *jwt.Token) (any, error) {
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if _, ok := t.Method.(*jwt.SigningMethodHMAC); !ok {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected signing method: %v", t.Header["alg"])
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}
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return secret, nil
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})
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if err != nil {
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return Claims{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid token: %w", err)
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}
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c, ok := token.Claims.(*Claims)
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if !ok || !token.Valid {
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return Claims{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid token claims")
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}
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if c.Type == "host" {
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return Claims{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid token: host token cannot be used as user token")
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}
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return *c, nil
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}
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// HostClaims are the JWT payload for host agent tokens.
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type HostClaims struct {
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Type string `json:"typ"` // always "host"
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HostID string `json:"host_id"`
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jwt.RegisteredClaims
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}
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// SignHostJWT signs a long-lived (1 year) JWT for a registered host agent.
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func SignHostJWT(secret []byte, hostID string) (string, error) {
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now := time.Now()
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claims := HostClaims{
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Type: "host",
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HostID: hostID,
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RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
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Subject: hostID,
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IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(now),
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ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(now.Add(hostJWTExpiry)),
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},
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}
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token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodHS256, claims)
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return token.SignedString(secret)
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}
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// VerifyHostJWT parses and validates a host JWT, returning the claims on success.
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// It rejects user JWTs by checking the "typ" claim.
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func VerifyHostJWT(secret []byte, tokenStr string) (HostClaims, error) {
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token, err := jwt.ParseWithClaims(tokenStr, &HostClaims{}, func(t *jwt.Token) (any, error) {
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if _, ok := t.Method.(*jwt.SigningMethodHMAC); !ok {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected signing method: %v", t.Header["alg"])
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}
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return secret, nil
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})
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if err != nil {
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return HostClaims{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid token: %w", err)
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}
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c, ok := token.Claims.(*HostClaims)
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if !ok || !token.Valid {
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return HostClaims{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid token claims")
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}
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if c.Type != "host" {
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return HostClaims{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid token type: expected host")
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}
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return *c, nil
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}
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